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N SEPTEMBER 1965, THE BISHOPS OF THE Second Vatican 
Council were deep into the drafting process of Gaudium et Spes. 
That document began with the now famous words: “The joys and 
the hopes, the griefs and the anxieties of the men of this age, 
especially those who are poor or in any way afflicted, these are the 
joys and hopes, the griefs and anxieties of the followers of Christ” 
(Gaudium et Spes, no. 1). That same month, Senator Robert F. 
Kennedy paid a surprise visit to the Willowbrook State School, a state-
supported institution for children and young adults with intellectual 
and developmental disabilities (IDD) in Staten Island, NY.1 Kennedy 
was astounded and disgusted by what he saw. At the time, 
Willowbrook was housing 6000 individuals in a space designed for 
4000. The facilities were understaffed and in disrepair, disease was 
rampant, and education was non-existent. Kennedy described the 
situation as one that “borders on a snake pit…[where] the children live 
in filth…[and] many of our fellow citizens are suffering tremendously 
because of a lack of attention, lack of imagination, lack of adequate 
manpower.”2  
I raise the chronological nearness of these two events in order to 
highlight just how important the words “in any way afflicted” are to 
                                                          
1 It is important, at the outset, to note a distinction between the terms “impairment” 
and “disability.” These terms have been used in various ways throughout the growing 
field of disability studies, but, for my purposes here, I will distinguish between the 
biological conditions which impair one’s cognitive abilities (i.e. cognitive 
impairment) and cultural meaning and identity ascribed to those with such a condition 
(i.e. intellectual and developmental disability). I address this distinction in greater 
detail later in this essay. 
2 “Senator Robert Kennedy Visiting Institutions in New York,” Parallels in Time: A 
History of Developmental Disabilities, mn.gov/mnddc/parallels/five/5b/bobby-
kennedy-snakepits.html. In the video, Kennedy’s use of the term “snake pit” is likely 
a reference to the 1949 movie “The Snake Pit,” a semi-autobiographical story about 
one women’s experience in a mental institution. The movie’s authentic telling of 
conditions in a mental institution is credited with inspiring a series of reforms in 
mental institutions in the 1950s; see “The Snake Pit,” Turner Classic Movies, 
www.tcm.com/this-month/article/2768380/The-Snake-Pit.html.  
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the bold and beautiful claim that opens Gaudium et Spes. The suffering 
experienced by the residents of Willowbrook and other ‘schools’ like 
it ranks among the greatest atrocities committed in this country. While 
it would be a stretch to believe that the authors of Gaudium et Spes 
were thinking of Willowbrook when they claimed the griefs and 
anxieties of those “in any way afflicted” as a central concern of the 
Church, there should be little doubt that the suffering of those with 
IDD fits well under it, both in the institution system of the mid-
twentieth century and at the hands of modern constructs today. 
Thankfully, today, the inhuman conditions of institutions like 
Willowbrook have been exposed and the institutionalization model for 
persons with IDD has been largely dismantled. Moreover, with the 
establishment of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in 1990, 
protections have been set to ensure that such a situation will not be 
repeated. However, neither of these advancements have fully 
alleviated the particular griefs and anxieties experienced by persons 
with IDD in the modern world. The ADA certainty aspired to such a 
task when it set the lofty but worthwhile goals of “assur[ing] equality 
of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic 
self-sufficiency” for people with disabilities.3 However, now more 
than twenty-five years on, much work remains to be done. While the 
challenges differ in degree, when compared to the institution era, 
intentional and unintentional segregation of those with disabilities 
remains a serious roadblock to “full participation” and a causal factor 
in the perpetuation of stigma. In turn, social stigma and inadequate 
advocacy severely limits the achievement of “equality of opportunity” 
as a norm. Likewise, community-based housing and employment 
programs—while well-envisioned for developing the conditions for 
“independent living” and “economic self-sufficiency”—suffer from 
inadequate funding, shortages of qualified care providers, and an 
overall lack of political will to respond to inadequacies in the system. 
In light of the ongoing social challenges or issues facing 
individuals with IDD in our time, I want to highlight some 
underappreciated aspects of Catholic social teaching that we would do 
well to recall. The discussion proceeds in four parts. First, I identify 
several key contemporary social challenges that continue to face 
individuals with IDD. Second, I trace the root of those particular 
challenges to the social forces of industrialization, urbanization, and 
social Darwinism in the second half of the nineteenth century. Third, 
on the basis of that historical framework, I argue that the contemporary 
Catholic response to the various social challenges of disabled persons 
has much to gain from serious consideration of Catholic social 
                                                          
3 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Public Law 101-336. 108th Congress, 2nd 
session (July 26, 1990), www.ada.gov/pubs/adastatute08mark.htm.  
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thought’s beginnings in Rerum Novarum—the Church’s response to 
the suffering of the working class, as they bore the burden of the 
nineteenth century social forces just mentioned. So conceived, 
developments in Catholic social teaching since Rerum Novarum offer 
clues as to how the tradition can be applied to the particular social 
challenges facing cognitively impaired persons. Finally, I conclude 
with a proposal on how this interpretation of the tradition might further 
be developed and promoted.  
 
THE CURRENT STATE OF COGNITIVE DISABILITY IN  
AMERICAN SOCIETY 
I focus on four overlapping social challenges or issues facing 
individuals with IDD today: segregation and stigma; inadequate, 
unfulfilling, and unlivable wage-earning employment opportunities; 
lack of adequate housing and care; and poor education and training. 
These are by no means the only issues at stake, but they are some of 
the larger blocks to achieving the ADA goals of “equality of 
opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-
sufficiency.” 
According to the Shriver Report, a survey conducted by the Harris 
Institute in 2015, only 56% of Americans personally know someone 
with a cognitive disability and a mere 13% say they have a friend with 
a cognitive disability. In contrast, a whopping 42% of Americans have 
had no personal contact with someone with a cognitive disability. 
Similarly, while 93% of Americans believe that adults with cognitive 
disabilities should be encouraged to work, and 80% said that they 
would be willing to hire someone with a cognitive disability, a paltry 
5% have actually worked with someone with a cognitive disability.4 
One of the primary reasons that only 5% of the national population 
reports having worked with someone with a cognitive disability is that 
only 6% of adults with a cognitive disability actually work in the 
community. According to a survey of family members of adults with 
cognitive disabilities, collected by the disability advocacy group, The 
Arc, 9% of those surveyed indicate that their family member was 
working in a “sheltered workshop or enclave setting” while a massive 
85% of families report that their family members were unemployed. 
This despite the fact that “the majority of people with [cognitive] 
disabilities want to have a job in the community.” 5  
Making matters worse, even among those working, nearly half 
work for less than minimum wage. Subminimum wages, which can be 
                                                          
4 “Insight into Intellectual Disabilities in the 21st Century,” Disabled World, 
www.disabled-world.com/disability/types/cognitive/21st-century.php.  
5 “Still in the Shadows with Their Future Uncertain: A Report on Family and 
Individual Needs for Disability Supports (FINDS).” The Arc, www.thearc.org/docu-
ment.doc?id=3672. 
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as low as $0.25 per hour, are legal loopholes built into the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938 with the intention of encouraging the hiring of 
people with disabilities.6 Among those unemployed, or severely 
underemployed, approximately 4.9 million Americans with a 
cognitive disability—those with extremely low wages or unemployed, 
and lacking other resources—rely on Supplemental Security Income 
(SSI) for their basic survival. However, in 2014, the average annual 
income of a single individual receiving SSI payments was $8,995, 
23% below the federal poverty level. Twenty-one states do 
supplement federal SSI payments, but these are also meager, ranging 
from a high of $362 in Alaska to a low of $5 in Nebraska. Moreover, 
these supplements have declined by 7% since 1998.7  
One consequence of these paltry rations is that those who do not 
live with family are effectively priced out of a decent living 
arrangement. The 2014 national average annual rent for a modest one-
bedroom unit was $9,360 or 104% of SSI income, and the national 
average rent for a studio was $8088 or 90% of an average SSI 
payment.8 The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) Section 811 Supportive Housing program was established to 
help solve this cost by producing affordable, accessible housing units 
that are specifically designed for people with disabilities, but the 
program has historically been unable to keep up with identified 
demand.9  
Housing is just one of many government-funded services with 
extremely long waiting lists, including personal assistance, therapy, 
employment supports, and transportation. One third of those 
interviewed for The Arc’s study reported that they are on a waiting list 
for government-funded services of some kind. “A conservative 
estimate is that there are more than 1 million people with [cognitive 
disabilities] waiting for services that may never come.”10 At the same 
time, threats of a further shortage loom as nearly 900,000 individuals 
currently live with a caregiver (typically a family member) who is over 
                                                          
6 “Still in the Shadows”; Cheryl Corley, “Subminimum Wages For The Disabled: 
Godsend Or Exploitation?” National Public Radio, www.npr.org/ 
2014/04/23/305854409/subminimum-wages-for-the-disabled-godsend-or-
exploitation. 
7 Emily Cooper et al., “Priced Out in 2014: The Housing Crisis for People with 
Disabilities,” Technical Assistance Collaborative, www.tacinc.org/knowledge-
resources/priced-out-findings/. 
8 Cooper et al., “Priced Out in 2014.” 
9 The Frank Melville Supportive Housing Investment Act of 2010 was aimed at 
modernizing the Section 811 program to more efficiently meet demand as they have 
not before. Significant waiting lists remain, however. 
10 “Still in the Shadows.” See also “In California, Aid Withers For People With 
Developmental Disabilities,” National Public Radio, www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2015/12/04/458458916/in-california-aid-withers-for-people-with-
developmental-disabilities. 
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60 years old and thus will soon not be able to continue to care for the 
individual with a disability.11 
Finally, there is an argument to be made that part of the reason the 
low employment rate for adults with cognitive disabilities is because 
they are not receiving proper education when they are young. In The 
Arc study, 52% of families reported that their family member left 
school without receiving a high school diploma—a necessary 
prerequisite for employment in many cases. At the same time, fewer 
than one third of students with cognitive disabilities are fully 
integrated into mainstream classes, while more than one third of 
students are completely segregated from the mainstream students.12 
Thus, our special educational system, beneficial as it is in many cases, 
is for most people the first encounter with the normativity of 
segregation that remains in our society and consequently serves to 
reinforce a norm of segregation throughout the lives of people with 
IDD. As it is normative in schools, it should be no wonder that 42% 
of American adults have had no personal contact with someone with 
a cognitive disability.  
 
THE MODERN SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF COGNITIVE DISABILITY 
As with many social issues, alleviating the suffering of individuals 
with IDD will require more than the establishment of rights or a mere 
material response (i.e. proper funding of housing, education, and 
employment programs). Addressing the challenges just laid out will 
require a shift in the social understanding of disability. Thus, it is 
important to recall the distinction between disability and impairment:  
 
Disability is not a physical or mental defect but a cultural and minority 
identity. To call disability an identity is to recognize that it is not a 
biological or natural property but an elastic social category both 
subject to social control and capable of effecting social change.13 
 
This distinction is important because, while cognitive impairments are 
a natural part of the human experience and have been throughout 
history, the social boundaries that emerge in response to those 
impairments operate uniquely in each given society and are, in fact, a 
product of that society and its history. Historians of disability have 
frequently observed that our understanding—who is considered 
disabled, how disability is defined, what cultural meanings are 
                                                          
11 Cooper et al., “Priced Out in 2014.” 
12 “Still in the Shadows.” 
13 Tobin Siebers, Disability Theory (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008), 
4, hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015082696892. 
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ascribed to a particular disability—is shaped largely by the social 
context of and the historical moment in which disability occurs.14  
Moreover, not only are conceptions of disability historically 
located, but they are in fact the product of human effort. “Social 
problems like mental retardation are in fact social constructions…built 
from a variety of materials: the desire to help and the need to control, 
infatuation with science and technique and professional status, 
responses to social change and instability.”15 With this in mind, I argue 
that our contemporary understanding of IDD has emerged in large part 
from the changes in the social status of those with cognitive 
impairments during the second half of the nineteenth century.16 I 
contend that three factors—in particular, urbanization, industrializa-
tion, and the rise of social Darwinism—converged to lay the 
foundations of much of our contemporary understanding of IDD.  
 
                                                          
14 Katherine Castles, “‘Nice Average Americans,’” in Mental Retardation in America, 
ed. Steven Noll and James W. Trent Jr., (New York: New York University Press, 
2004), 352.  
15 James W. Trent, Jr., Inventing the Feeble Mind: A History of Mental Retardation 
in the United States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 6. 
16 Space constraints limit my attempt to only a broad stroke summary in these pages. 
For a more detailed examination of the social construction of cognitive disability, see 
Trent, Jr., Inventing the Feeble Mind; Michael Wehmeyer, ed., The Story of 
Intellectual Disability: An Evolution of Meaning, Understanding, and Public 
Perception, 1st ed. (Baltimore: Brookes Publishing, 2013); David Wright, Downs: 
The History of a Disability (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), chap. 1; and C. 
F. Goodey, A History of Intelligence and “Intellectual Disability”: The Shaping of 
Psychology in Early Modern Europe, Kindle Edition (Burlington: Ashgate 
Publishing, 2013). Additionally, Henri-Jacques Stiker’s A History of Disability, trans. 
William Sayers (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), focuses primarily 
on physical and sensory disability with occasional reference to cognitive disability but 
offers an important examination of the social construction of disability, widely 
construed, going back to antiquity. Similarly, Michel Foucault’s landmark text, 
History of Madness, ed. Jean Khalfa (New York: Routledge, 2006), while primarily 
an inquiry into mental illness and not cognitive disability, nevertheless offers 
important insight into the social construction of normalcy and abnormality with regard 
to human reason. See Shelley Lynn Tremain, ed., Foucault and the Government of 
Disability (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2010), 11: “An argument about 
disability that takes Foucault’s approach would be concerned to show that there is 
indeed a causal relation between impairment and disability, and it is precisely this: the 
category of impairment emerged and, in many respects, persists in order to legitimize 
the governmental practices that generated it in the first place.” Foucault occupies an 
important enough place in the field to be noted here, but a full Foucaultian critique 
leads away from the present topic. For more, therefore, Foucault’s ideas find 
application to disability in two important works edited by Shelley Tremain: the 
collection of essays Foucault and the Government of Disability as well as the June 
2015 issue of the journal Foucault Studies offered on the 10th anniversary of the book 
(Foucault Studies, no 9).  
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COGNITIVE DISABILITY IN THE PRE-INDUSTRIAL WORLD 
 
In 1835, Thomas Cameron was a young postmaster in rural North 
Carolina; ten-year-old Lloyd Fuller was studying alongside his older 
brothers in their middle class New England home. Thomas and Lloyd 
would today be considered developmentally disabled; in the 1830s, 
that difference alone did not disqualify them from work, education, 
social invitations, or travel.17 
 
Literature and historical accounts as far back as the sixteenth 
century give us images of the “village idiot” who was left to wander 
about in public, but, as historian David Wright notes, there is little 
historical evidence to sustain this stereotype as normative.18 More 
typically, in the centuries leading up to the industrial revolution, 
individuals with cognitive impairments were integrated members of 
society and, more fundamentally, their families. The centrality of the 
family in this regard is evident in legal statutes going back at least to 
the thirteenth century English court document Prerogativa Regis 
(Kings Prerogative), which gave the King the right to seize the 
property of fatui naturales (natural fools) who were deemed unable to 
rule the estate themselves and place it in the care of a more capable 
family member, “who would commit themselves to administering the 
property (and maintaining the idiot and his family) in a responsible 
manner.”19 When the “fool” passed away, his lands and title would be 
returned to his heirs. Similarly, at the other end of the economic 
spectrum, under the Poor Laws established under Elizabeth I, local 
parishes in England and Wales were deemed responsible for providing 
relief to the impoverished in their locality, including those with 
cognitive impairments. However, aid for those who could not care for 
themselves fell again to kin. Even when family was not available, aid 
took the form of “boarding out,” a form of early foster care (thus again 
following a familial model, artificial as it was).  
That this familial care norm would continue well into the 
nineteenth century should not be surprising. During that time, the 
family was the fundamental social and economic unit of society. On 
the economic side, family farms and family businesses dominated the 
economy, and in America’s pre-industrial agrarian economy there was 
no lack of unskilled labor to be done. For the vast majority of society, 
education was largely provided at home. As such, families made a 
                                                          
17 Penny Richards, “Beside Her Sat Her Idiot Child: Families and Developmental 
Disability in Mid-Nineteenth-Century America,” in Mental Retardation in America: 
A Historical Reader, ed. Steven Noll and James Trent (New York: New York 
University Press, 2004), 65. 
18 Wright, Downs, 24. 
19 Wright, Downs, 21. 
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place for all members of the clan, regardless of their abilities or 
disabilities. Social hierarchies in all classes remained very tied to 
familial lines. Hereditary rights remained a large part of the 
organization of society. Even as families served as the primary social 
unit, local communities also operated as an extension of the family as 
evidenced by the responsibility of the local parish in the Elizabethan 
Poor Laws and boarding out.  
Early twentieth century sociologist Emil Durkheim identified these 
traditional, familial and community based networks as constructed on 
what he termed “mechanical solidarity.”20 In mechanical solidarity, 
relationships are held together by commonality. Local communities in 
the pre-industrial West shared the same rituals, worshiped at the same 
churches, attended the same schools, and partook of the same festivals. 
They also shared the same immediate history: when a drought hit a 
localized agrarian community or when a harvest was plentiful, all in 
the community were affected. According to Durkheim, these shared 
experiences were what held society together.  
CARE FOR DISABILITY IN AN URBANIZED WORLD 
The nineteenth century was a period of exponential growth, 
massive change, and important tests for America. The nation 
expanded its borders, its population, its economy and its power. It was 
a century of turmoil and new beginnings. Near the eve of the century, 
America mourned the death of its first president and by mid-century 
survived its bloodiest and only civil war. And yet, over the course of 
the century, technology advanced like never before: 
 
By the end of the 1880s, workers in urban settings rode elevators up 
to their offices in the amazing 10-story skyscrapers that were popping 
up seemingly everywhere. Once at their desks, they turned on the 
lights in their electrically lit offices, made calls on one of Bell’s 
amazing telephones, and typed letters on their new Remington 
typewriters.21 
 
The advance of technology had a tremendous effect on society at large. 
New farm machinery meant that less manual labor was needed on the 
farms. At the same time, the rise of technology created an insatiable 
appetite for factory work. These two factors catalyzed a mass 
migration from rural areas to urban cities in America.  
                                                          
20 Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
2014), 57ff. 
21 Phillip M. Ferguson, “The Development of Systems of Supports: Intellectual 
Disabilities in Middle Modern Times (1800 CE to 1899 CE),” in The Story of 
Intellectual Disability: An Evolution of Meaning, Understanding, and Public 
Perception, ed. Michael Wehmeyer (Baltimore: Brookes Publishing, 2013), 81. 
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The urbanization of America had a weakening effect on family 
bonds. With less work needed on the farms, many young adults left 
their family for work in the city. Distanced from traditional familial 
structures, urbanized workers sought new social structures in their 
new environment. The factory, rather than family, became the 
economic hub of society, while class replaced family as the 
fundamental unit of culture. Moreover, in the cities, factory work and 
especially the assembly line were made efficient by a specialization of 
labor.  
The urban living environment encouraged specialization in other 
areas as well. No longer did each family own its own cow and churn 
its own butter. Rather, these former domestic tasks became centralized 
and sold as commodities. These shifting conditions created a 
functional difference in the forces that previously held society 
together. Under mechanical solidarity, similarity drew neighbors into 
community, but, in the new urbanized, centralized, and individualized 
world, society was held together by an individualized need of the 
other, or what Durkheim termed “organic solidarity.” When each 
individual has a highly specialized task in society, both the survival of 
the individual and the functioning of society as a whole rely on the 
specialization of countless others.22 
Amidst these vast changes in society, it was likely inevitable that 
our societal response to cognitive impairment would also change. 
 
Although people with intellectual disability seldom drove the engines 
of change, they were carried along with dramatic shifts in both 
definition and response to what was perceived to be a growing 
population of unproductive and dependent people, draining energy 
from the marketplace and distracting families from their proper role 
as sources of labor and respite for a hard-working population.23 
 
While individuals with cognitive impairments found a natural place in 
the family and local community under the bonds of mechanical 
solidarity, in the urbanized, industrialized, and individualized 
economy, where an individual was measured by what they could bring 
to the table, what they could offer to the collective machine, those who 
were “unproductive” and “dependent” had no natural place.  
WORK AND DISABILITY IN AN INDUSTRIALIZED WORLD 
 In the midst of the great industrialization and urbanization of the 
nineteenth century, two economic downturns (1837-1843 and 1857-
1861) prompted a need for an economic safety net in the new 
urbanized landscape. As noted above, in traditional economies, entire 
                                                          
22 Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, 88ff. 
23 Ferguson, “The Development of Systems of Supports,” 81. 
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communities would bear their fates together, sharing the burdens of 
economic hardships around the community. In the new industrialized 
economy, social structures built around individualism meant that some 
would remain afloat while others sank. For those in the latter category, 
a wide array of “institutional solutions for all types of devalued, or 
simply nonproductive, groups of people” arose.24  
The first of these “institutional solutions” was the explosion of 
government-run almshouses in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries.25 These almshouses were intended to serve as a temporary 
respite for unemployed individuals as they got back on their feet. 
While these almshouses did serve a social good, they were also viewed 
with disdain—a last resort solution that marked the lowest point for a 
prideful worker. During this same time, work was also becoming more 
technical as the operation of machinery replaced many simple manual 
tasks, while mass urbanization prompted tremendous competition 
amongst workers for available jobs. Thus, even when a task was 
relatively low skill, competition favored those who could do low skill 
tasks faster and more efficiently. Soon a class of individuals emerged 
that had a very difficult time of ever securing and holding a job in this 
new economy and so remained dependent on the almshouses. In this 
environment, a distinction arose between the temporary poor and those 
with disabilities or mental illness. Those with disabilities had come to 
be understood as the “legitimate” poor, free from public disdain: “True 
or justifiable poverty entailed disability.”26 When the economy 
recovered in the 1860s, public almshouses fell out of favor, but the 
view that those with disabilities should “legitimately” be supported by 
the state remained, demanding a new solution for the organized care 
of “idiots.” 
EDUCATION AND DISABILITY IN A MODERN WORLD 
It was around this same time, psychology began to emerge as a 
distinct academic discipline and the specialized study of “idiocy” (as 
opposed to “insanity”) grew as its own sub-discipline. In 1840, a 
French doctor named Edward Séguin had begun a school in Paris 
dedicated to the education of individuals with cognitive disabilities. 
Public education for mainstream children was only just becoming a 
public priority, so the idea of specialized education for those with 
disabilities was especially novel. Seguin’s model was rooted in an 
                                                          
24 Phillip M. Ferguson, “The Legacy of the Almshouse,” Mental Retardation in 
America: A Historical Reader, eds. Steven Noll and James Trent (New York: New 
York University Press, 2004), 48. 
25 Between 1824 and 1850, Massachusetts went from 83 almshouses to 204. In the 
same years, New York went from 30 local almshouses in the metropolitan areas of 
the state to a county almshouse system in which 56 of 60 counties had centralized 
almshouses by 1857. See Ferguson, “The Legacy of the Almshouse,” 48. 
26 Ferguson, “The Legacy of the Almshouse,” 51; original emphasis.  
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assumption that education could only be effective if the students were 
segregated from family and community. The belief was that, with the 
proper education, individuals with cognitive disabilities could be 
“freed from inactivity and no longer a burden to their families” and 
would return to their families and communities upon completion of 
the program.27  
Within a decade, schools using Seguin’s model emerged in the 
United States. The Massachusetts Asylum for Idiotic and 
Feebleminded Youth (est. 1847) and the New York Asylum for Idiots 
(est. 1851) were two of the first. When Séguin, himself, emigrated to 
America in 1850, his stature in the world medical community added 
legitimacy to the cause, and, by 1870, the state school had replaced 
the almshouse as a “solution” for disability in America.28 
Initially, this education movement met some successes in training 
and graduating “productive idiots.” However, for every successful 
case, there were other residents whose “limitations were great and 
whose eventual release was doubtful.”29 For those that did “graduate,” 
expectations of a smooth transition into the community never 
materialized. The turbulent economic landscape meant that many 
could not find work in their home communities. With no place to go 
in the community, many graduates were forced back to the asylums. 
By the 1880s, the focus of the state schools began shifting from 
education and graduation to care and custody. 
SEGREGATION AND DISABILITY IN AN EVOLVING WORLD 
In the 1860s, John Langdon Down (for whom Down syndrome is 
named) was the medical superintendent at the Earlswood Asylum for 
Idiots in England. Down had made a name for himself as a proponent 
of separating idiot asylums from lunatic asylums. (Cognitive disability 
and mental illness had previously been treated as similar conditions.) 
The Earlswood Asylum was the first asylum dedicated specifically to 
individuals with cognitive impairments in England.  
Down was also a strong proponent of specialized education and 
separate treatment for individuals with cognitive impairments. Down, 
however, came up a generation after Seguin, Howe, and Wilbur and 
thus was influenced to a much greater degree by Darwinism and the 
biological experiments and hereditary studies of Gregor Mendel, 
O.S.A. Down began to speculate whether cognitive disability 
represented a regression of species to an earlier form. Drawing on 
popular notions that non-Caucasian races represented less developed 
species, Down claimed that each of these conditions represented a 
                                                          
27 Trent, Jr., Inventing the Feeble Mind, 26; Ferguson, “The Development of Systems 
of Supports,” 87. 
28 Trent, Jr., Inventing the Feeble Mind, 17–18. 
29 Trent, Jr., Inventing the Feeble Mind, 28. 
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regression to an earlier form of humanity and began to classify 
different types of idiots according to the races they most resembled. 
The most well-known of these was the “Mongolian idiot” (the 
condition now called Down syndrome), but other classifications 
included “Malay,” “Ethiopian,” “Aztec,” and “Caucasian.”30 Down 
claimed that this “great Mongolian family” represented “the reversion 
of Caucasian children to an earlier ‘less developed’ race.”31 While the 
racially discriminatory undertones of this analysis cannot be ignored, 
Down’s ethnic classification was never fully adopted by medical 
science, and, in the 1930s, Lionel Penrose conducted blood type 
studies that debunked Down’s devolutionary theory. Socially, 
however, the lasting effects of Down’s work and the notion that those 
with disabilities were somehow less human were immeasurable.  
Down was not the only person who saw implications for disability 
in Darwinism. In the 1870s, the eugenics movement emerged in 
Europe and America. This movement proposed that, if Darwin’s 
theory of evolution is correct, then it places upon society a moral 
burden to actively advance our species in future generations.32 The 
simplest way to accomplish this was by eliminating from our 
reproducing population traits that could be viewed as negative and 
unproductive.33 In the United States, this meant segregation (and later 
sterilization) of those with “undesirable traits,” such as cognitive 
disabilities. During this time, the view of those with disabilities as 
“legitimate poor” gave way to a view of disability as a menace to 
society. In 1870, the U.S. census, which had counted “idiots” as a 
separate category since 1840, began placing this category in the same 
column as criminals and convicts. And in 1882, Congress passed the 
“Undesirables Act,” which excluded convicts, paupers, the insane, and 
idiots from immigrating to the United States.34 In 1878, Josephine 
Shaw Lowell opened the Custodial Asylum for Feeble Minded 
                                                          
30 Down noted that Mongolian idiocy was the most prevalent at Earlswood. This 
observation has proven indicative of the greater population as Down syndrome 
remains the most common condition of cognitive disability. 
31 David Wright, “Mongols in our Midst,” in Mental Retardation in America: A 
Historical Reader, ed. Steven Noll and James Trent (New York: New York University 
Press, 2004), 102. Historians today are quick to note that while these classifications 
seem offensive today, they were actually considered liberal in Victorian England. 
While the common theory of the time was that other races represented completely 
different species of lesser value, Down’s theories understood that all humans evolved 
from the same species. See Wright, “Mongols in our Midst,” 103-104.  
32 It should be noted that the 19th century not only marked the rise of evolutionary 
theory in biology, but also utilitarian theory in philosophy. Eugenics represented the 
merger of the absolutist forms of both of these theories.  
33 Of course, the industrial revolution had simultaneously helped to solidify the 
commonly-held view that “success” was defined in terms of productivity, and 
productivity was a function of intelligence. 
34 Trent, Jr., Inventing the Feeble Mind, 86. 
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Women in Newark, N.Y., marking the first American institution 
established specifically for the custodial care (as opposed to the 
education) for individuals with IDD.  
 
Shall the State of New York suffer a moral leprosy to spread and taint 
her future generations, because she lacks the courage to set apart those 
who have inherited the deadly poison and who will hand it down to 
their children, even to third and fourth generations?35 
 
The Custodial Asylum represented a new model of care in which 
segregation was permanent and the end in and of itself. In the state 
schools, education was the goal, and the “boarding” nature of the 
school was a means to that end. Moreover, while the original state 
schools were set up close to state capitals, as custodial care became 
the primary focus, institutions were designed as farm colonies in 
remote rural environments. During this time, families were 
discouraged from visiting individuals in the asylums and instead 
encouraged to forget that the family member even existed. Finally, in 
contrast to the state schools, there was little hope in the institutions 
that anyone would be able to “graduate” and return to mainstream 
society. Under this model, custodial care was permanent, non-
educational, and as far removed from mainstream society as possible.  
In summary, in the span of three generations in the second half of 
the nineteenth century, the typical life of an American with a cognitive 
disability went from being an integrated part of the education, work, 
and social life of one’s family and local community to a menial and 
segregated existence of custodial care, removed from family and 
community as a menace to mainstream social life. Today, while the 
most glaringly undignified aspects of this era have been dismantled, 
several social constructs regarding disability remain. First and 
foremost, even as society moves, in theory, toward greater integration 
of those with cognitive impairments into mainstream society, the 
legacy of cognitive disability understood as a menace, mystery, and 
drain on society still looms large in our current context and creates a 
reality in which nearly half of American adults have never had any 
serious contact with an individual with a cognitive impairment.36 
Second, the shift away from a traditional family structure and toward 
                                                          
35 Josephine Shaw Lowell, “One Means for Preventing Pauperism,” in Proceedings 
of the National Conference of Charities and Correction (1879): 189-200, as quoted in 
Nicole Rafter, “The Criminalization of Mental Retardation,” in Mental Retardation 
in America, ed. Steven Noll and James W. Trent Jr. (New York: New York University 
Press, 2004), 239. 
36 Couple this history with a nearly a century of institutionalization in which the 
typical American neighborhood, school, and church did not include cognitive 
disability, and a certain mystery and trepidation about how to relate to those with 
cognitive impairments compounds the issue all the more.  
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government provided care, education, housing, and employment for 
those with disabilities remains at least partially normative today. Even 
those who continue to live with their families into adulthood still often 
participate in public special education and other training, draw SSI and 
other government funds, and partake of other public services for those 
with disabilities, making the current role of the family as much 
advocacy as caregiving. Third, the post-industrial capitalist economy 
that is built on organic solidarity and values individuals based on their 
skill, ability, and contribution remains our standard today as it was at 
the height of the industrial revolution. Such a society can only locate 
individuals with cognitive disabilities at the economic bottom and 
dependent on either a social safety net or the charity of others (an 
economic state that is underscored by a historical legacy in which 
disability was synonymous with a condition of legitimate poverty.) 
 
CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT: A RESPONSE TO  
SOCIAL UPHEAVAL 
It is no coincidence that modern Catholic social thought emerged 
around the same time that institutionalization was becoming the new 
standard of care for individuals with IDD, for when he wrote Rerum 
Novarum, Pope Leo XIII was aiming to address many of the same 
social forces that gave rise to such treatment of individuals with IDD. 
In his opening soliloquy that set the stage for the entirety of the 
tradition, Leo wrote,  
 
The elements of the conflict now raging are unmistakable, in the vast 
expansion of industrial pursuits and the marvelous discoveries of 
science; in the changed relations between masters and workmen; in 
the enormous fortunes of some few individuals, and the utter poverty 
of the masses; the increased self-reliance and closer mutual 
combination of the working classes; as also, finally, in the prevailing 
moral degeneracy. The momentous gravity of the state of things now 
obtaining fills every mind with painful apprehension; wise men are 
discussing it; practical men are proposing schemes; popular meetings, 
legislatures, and rulers of nations are all busied with it - actually there 
is no question which has taken deeper hold on the public mind. 
 
Therefore, venerable brethren, as on former occasions when it seemed 
opportune to refute false teaching…, We thought it expedient now to 
speak on the condition of the working classes. (Rerum Novarum, no. 
1) 
 
Leo XIII leaves no doubt that the ultimate object of his work is the 
plight of working people of that age. While Leo XIII’s words are not 
directly addressed to individuals with IDD, in identifying the social 
shifts of the urbanized, industrialized, modern world as the cause of 
the plight of the working classes, Rerum Novarum and the Catholic 
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social tradition it spurred offer a theologically grounded critique of 
modernism that is useful for the task at hand.  
 
LAYING THE GROUNDWORK: THE THEOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE 
OF HUMAN DIGNITY 
The cornerstone of Catholic social teaching is the fundamental 
dignity of the human person. “God has imprinted his own image and 
likeness on man (see Gen 1:26), conferring upon him an incomparable 
dignity…. In effect, beyond the rights which man acquires by his own 
work, there exist rights which do not correspond to any work he 
performs, but which flow from his essential dignity as a person” 
(Centesimus Annus, no 11). This dignity is unique to humans—as the 
only part of creation made in the image of God—but universal to all 
humans, regardless of age, race, gender, creed, or (dis)ability. A 
simplistic application of this theme would argue that those with 
disabilities are made in the image of God and thus share in the unique 
dignity of humanity. Equally human, the Church and her members 
have a duty to protect the dignity of those with disabilities against the 
forces in this world that would seek to take that dignity away. As the 
US Catholic Bishops note, human dignity defines the fundamental and 
basic orientation each must take towards another: “Human 
personhood must be respected with a reverence that is religious. When 
we deal with each other, we should do so with the sense of awe that 
arises in the presence of something holy and sacred. For that is what 
human beings are: we are created in the image of God.”37 
From John Langdon Down’s devolutionary theory of disability to 
capitalism’s emphasis on material production as the means of 
valuation for individuals, significant forces in the modern world have 
contributed to the view that individuals with disabilities are of less 
value than those who are not disabled. In response, Catholic social 
teaching appeals to the dignity of humanity as the theological 
justification for the establishment of basic rights (Gaudium et Spes, 
no. 26ff), such as those laid out in the ADA. This is all good, so far as 
it goes, but, as I have noted, the establishment of rights alone is 
insufficient for addressing the depth and the breadth of the social 
constructions that are embedded into our very understanding of 
disability. Fortunately, while Catholic social thought provides a 
framework for rights, it does not end with the bare assertion of rights.  
                                                          
37 National Conference of Catholic Bishops, Economic Justice for All: Pastoral Letter 
on Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy, 10th Anniversary edition, 
www.usccb.org/upload/economic_justice_for_all.pdf, no. 28. 
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RELIEVING THE TENSION BETWEEN FREEDOM AND COMMUNITY 
IN THE MODERN WORLD 
For Catholic social teaching, human dignity, rooted in the Imago 
Dei, also provides the theological grounding for both human freedom 
and human community. 
 
For Sacred Scripture teaches that man was created “to the image of 
God,” is capable of knowing and loving his Creator, and was 
appointed by Him as master of all earthly creatures that he might 
subdue them and use them to God’s glory. “What is man that you 
should care for him? You have made him little less than the angels, 
and crowned him with glory and honor. You have given him rule over 
the works of your hands, putting all things under his feet” (Ps. 8:5-7). 
But God did not create man as a solitary, for from the beginning “male 
and female he created them” (Gen. 1:27). Their companionship 
produces the primary form of interpersonal communion. For by his 
innermost nature man is a social being, and unless he relates himself 
to others he can neither live nor develop his potential. (Gaudium et 
Spes, no. 12) 
 
Human freedom, present in each individual from the moment of 
creation, is our freedom to make choices and act independently from 
the Divine will of God. However, even as humans are free to abuse 
this freedom, we are called to perfect our freedom by directing our 
choices toward God (Catechism, no. 1731). Community emerges from 
freedom as one of the primary commands of the Divine will: 
 
God, Who has fatherly concern for everyone, has willed that all men 
should constitute one family and treat one another in a spirit of 
brotherhood. For having been created in the image of God, Who “from 
one man has created the whole human race and made them live all 
over the face of the earth” (Acts 17:26), all men are called to one and 
the same goal, namely God Himself. 
 
For this reason, love for God and neighbor is the first and greatest 
commandment. Sacred Scripture, however, teaches us that the love of 
God cannot be separated from love of neighbor: “If there is any other 
commandment, it is summed up in this saying: Thou shalt love thy 
neighbor as thyself …. Love therefore is the fulfillment of the Law” 
(Rom. 13:9-10; see 1 John 4:20). To men growing daily more 
dependent on one another, and to a world becoming more unified 
every day, this truth proves to be of paramount importance. (Gaudium 
et Spes, no. 24) 
 
Thus, while freedom is fundamental to our humanity, the proper use 
of that freedom is to serve God and serve each other. 
The concepts of freedom and community are important as the 
devastating forces that emerged in the wake of the industrial 
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revolution were, in many ways, a perversion and overindulgence of 
human freedom and the undermining of human community. The status 
quo in 1891 was a condition in which freedom went unchecked by 
Church, state, or other communal organization: 
 
[S]ome opportune remedy must be found quickly for the misery and 
wretchedness pressing so unjustly on the majority of the working 
class: for the ancient workingmen’s guilds were abolished in the last 
century, and no other protective organization took their place. Public 
institutions and the laws set aside the ancient religion. Hence, by 
degrees it has come to pass that working men have been surrendered, 
isolated and helpless, to the hardheartedness of employers and the 
greed of unchecked competition. (Rerum Novarum, no. 9) 
 
Leo’s solution was to recognize the moral burden borne by the owner 
to each worker in accordance with natural law and the dignity of each 
human person: “The following duties bind the wealthy owner and the 
employer: not to look upon their work people as their bondsmen, but 
to respect in every man his dignity as a person ennobled by Christian 
character” (Rerum Novarum, no 20). That is, the owner ought to use 
his freedom in the service of God and community. 
At the same time, Leo cautioned about inverting the paradigm, and 
placing the community as the sole value to the exclusion of the 
exercise of individual human freedom, as the communists proposed. 
Leo defended private property and sought limits on the power of the 
communal government: 
 
The contention, then, that the civil government should at its option 
intrude into and exercise intimate control over the family and the 
household is a great and pernicious error. True, if a family finds itself 
in exceeding distress, utterly deprived of the counsel of friends, and 
without any prospect of extricating itself, it is right that extreme 
necessity be met by public aid, since each family is a part of the 
commonwealth. In like manner, if within the precincts of the 
household there occur grave disturbance of mutual rights, public 
authority should intervene to force each party to yield to the other its 
proper due; for this is not to deprive citizens of their rights, but justly 
and properly to safeguard and strengthen them. (Rerum Novarum, no. 
16) 
 
Here again, however, he does not reject the notion of communal 
authority and the need for public aid on the part of the commonwealth. 
Rather, he takes what modern society has placed at odds—individual 
freedom and the common good—and instead draws them together in 
service of the same ends: service of God and neighbor.  
There is a lesson in this for cognitive disability. Of the various 
social structures put in place to respond to cognitive disability, those 
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systems that allow too much individual freedom and favor the 
capitalist market will inevitably leave individuals with IDD in a 
position of scarcity and suffering. We saw this in the early industrial 
age, prior to the state schools. On the other hand, efforts to restrict 
freedom and create tightly controlled environments, such as in the 
institutional era, find philosophical parallels in the centralizing 
functions of communism. History has shown that overreaching by 
central authorities in the name of the common good leads to poor 
results for those with disabilities.  
It is in this impasse that society finds itself today. In recent decades, 
American society has stepped away from the atrocity of the institution 
system with the creation of successful community-based programs 
that seek explicitly to allow the greatest degree of freedom possible. 
At the same time, certain legacy factors keep society from being able 
to achieve such a state. On the one hand, society is still built on 
individualism and organic solidarity, so if the system allows too much 
individualized freedom—as is the case, for example, with 
employment today—then individuals with IDD will inevitably be left 
out. On the other hand, the legacy of centralized control means that 
funding and authority for any of these programs still runs through the 
centralized state, and, since individuals with IDD rank fairly low when 
it comes to governmental priorities, funding shortages and waitlists 
are common.  
In Rerum Novarum, Leo argued that “no practical solution for this 
[impoverishment] will ever be found apart from the intervention of 
religion and the Church” (no. 16). This is as true for disability as it 
was (and is) for poverty, for solving either of these issues requires a 
teleological anthropology that orients our freedom toward the love of 
God and neighbor. Secular documents of rights, while necessary to 
avoid a regression into atrocity, merely set a floor for societal 
treatment of those with disabilities. The recognition of the Imago Dei 
serves as a reminder that, by the grace of God, all are free and equal 
in dignity. Recognition of the Imago Dei in others, reminds us that in 
that freedom and in dignity, God calls us to community.  
 
A ‘THIRD WAY’ OF SOLIDARITY  
Being called to community requires the Church, both the institution 
and its membership, to be intentional about the basis of communal life. 
Earlier in this essay, I noted that, in his examination of the shift from 
traditional to modern economies, sociologist Emil Durkheim 
identified two types of solidarity. Durkheim’s “organic” solidarity was 
rooted in interdependence. I interact with you because I need 
something from you. This is the way of the modern world, built on a 
robust individualism, market capitalism, the division of labor, and 
exchange of goods. It is also one of the most fundamental stumbling 
blocks to the advancement of people or individuals or persons with 
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disabilities, since they often have less (materially) to offer than the 
nondisabled in the exchange and, consequently, are often excluded 
from active participation in society.  
Durkheim’s “mechanical” solidarity, on the other hand, arose not 
out of need for what the other can offer but out of commonality with 
the other. I interact with you because I share something in common 
with you. For Durkheim, mechanical solidarity typified the traditional 
way of life in small towns, where experiences, good and bad, were 
shared by all. Today, society cannot return to its pre-industrial norms, 
nor should it. The local bonds of mechanical solidarity, while perhaps 
a better state of affairs for people with disabilities, also gave rise to 
tremendous violence. Such bonds, rooted in cultural and material 
similarity, are at the very root of war, slavery, ethnic cleansing, racism, 
and genocide.  
Catholic social teaching calls individuals to solidarity but not in 
either of the senses that Durkheim uses the term. Catholic solidarity, 
by contrast, is a prescriptive command derived from our shared 
creation and existence.  
 
Interdependence must be transformed into solidarity, based upon the 
principle that the goods of creation are meant for all. That which 
human industry produces through the processing of raw materials, 
with the contribution of work, must serve equally for the good of all. 
(Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, no. 39) 
 
Or, as interpreted by the US Bishops:  
 
We have to move from our devotion to independence, through an 
understanding of interdependence, to a commitment to human soli-
darity. That challenge must find its realization in the kind of 
community we build among us. Love implies concern for all - 
especially the poor - and a continued search for those social and 
economic structures that permit everyone to share in a community that 
is a part of a redeemed creation. (Economic Justice for All, no. 365) 
 
By calling individuals each to embrace a solidarity that is rooted in a 
shared humanity rather than material interdependence (organic 
solidarity), Catholic social teaching includes people with disabilities 
as a fundamental part of society, rather than a dependent burden on 
society.  
 
SUBSIDIARITY, THE PRIMACY OF THE FAMILY, AND  
LOCAL ASSOCIATIONS 
For the Church, the primary model of solidarity is the nuclear 
family. The family is “the most intimate sphere in which people 
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cooperate…, [It is] the ‘first cell of society.’”38 As such, it is notable 
that families do not operate out of any type of functional 
interdependence. At birth, a child is fully dependent on her or his 
parents, and, the power of a smile or a giggle aside, an infant offers 
nothing of material value in exchange for his or her care. Rather, 
families are the most intimate and fundamental example of the bonds 
inherent in our nature as social beings. 
I have already noted the important advocacy role that family 
members play on behalf of individuals with disabilities today. Despite 
the efforts of the Church, the industrialized world continues to reward 
individuals on the basis of material merit and, thus, reject those who 
seem to have little of material value to offer. By exalting the bonds of 
family, however, Catholic social teaching acknowledges the family as 
the fundamental social unit to which individuals belong regardless of 
material merits. As such, it also gives warrant to the family’s role as 
advocate for individuals with IDD.  
The Church does not expect families to carry the load themselves, 
however. The bonds of the family, strong as they are, also offer the 
model of solidarity for the rest of the world to emulate.  
 
The roots of the contradiction between the solemn affirmation of 
human rights and their tragic denial in practice lies in a notion of 
freedom which exalts the isolated individual in an absolute way, and 
gives no place to solidarity, to openness to others and service of them 
… [E]very [person] is his “brother's keeper,” because God entrusts us 
to one another. (Evangelium Vitae, no. 19) 
 
While the call to solidarity is universal, the Church also recognizes the 
importance of it being fulfilled locally.  
 
Government should not replace or destroy smaller communities and 
individual initiative. Rather it should help them contribute more 
effectively to social well-being and supplement their activity when the 
demands of justice exceed their capacities. This does not mean, 
however, that the government that governs least, governs best. Rather 
it defines good government intervention as that which truly “helps” 
other social groups contribute to the common good by directing, 
urging, restraining, and regulating economic activity as “the occasion 
requires and necessity demands.” (Economic Justice for All, no. 124) 
 
This principle of “subsidiarity” offers valuable caution against the 
centralized and institutionalized responses to social problems that 
have, time and time again, failed to adequately respect the human 
dignity of individuals with disabilities.  
                                                          
38 Thomas Massaro, Living Justice: Catholic Social Teaching in Action (Lanham: 
Rowan & Littlefield Publisher, 2000), 124–125. 
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IN DEFENSE OF “AND VULNERABLE” 
If the principle of human dignity provides the cornerstone of 
Catholic social thought, then the principle of a Preferential Option for 
the Poor and Vulnerable is its capstone, that which completes the arch 
and holds it all together. For the past few decades the Preferential 
Option for the Poor has served as a summative claim, bringing 
together the whole of Catholic social thought into the singular idea. 
This principle places special burdens on those who are blessed with 
great fortune—be it material riches or physical or cognitive abilities—
and special rights on those who do not.  
 
Whoever has received from the divine bounty a large share of 
temporal blessings, whether they be external and material, or gifts of 
the mind, has received them for the purpose of using them for the 
perfecting of his own nature, and, at the same time, that he may 
employ them, as the steward of God's providence, for the benefit of 
others. “He that hath a talent,” said St. Gregory the Great, “let him see 
that he hide it not; he that hath abundance, let him quicken himself to 
mercy and generosity; he that hath art and skill, let him do his best to 
share the use and the utility hereof with his neighbor.” (Rerum 
Novarum, no. 23)39 
 
In this way, the preferential option inverts the typical paradigm in 
which those with fortune and power may wield those resources to gain 
more fortune and power, while those who lack these riches remain 
powerless and often, thereby, victimized. Without the principle of the 
preferential option, a follower of Catholic social thought might well 
be satisfied with equal treatment of the powerful and the powerless. A 
preferential option for the poor and vulnerable calls those who possess 
power and privilege to aim beyond equal treatment and, instead, seek 
a special place for those who are poor, lowly, and vulnerable.  
Often, however, the “and vulnerable” clause of the principle is 
omitted, thus reducing Catholic social concerns only to the materially 
poor. This is a mistake. A preferential option for those with disabilities 
suggests that it is not enough to simply tear down the institutions and 
asylums and return individuals with disabilities to mainstream society. 
Rather, the Church must give special attention to the needs of people 
with disabilities in a modern world that otherwise leaves no place for 
them. Special education, specialized group homes, and dedicated work 
programs that help to promote the livelihood of those with disabilities 
are necessary, but, as a society, we must also be mindful that an 
overemphasis on “special” programs encourages segregation rather 
that integration.  
                                                          
39 Leo XIII cites Gregory the Great, Hom. in Evang., 9, n. 7 (PL 76, 1109B). Emphasis 
added. 
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As a capstone, the Preferential Option for the Poor and Vulnerable 
not only stands on its own, but it also draws our attention to all of the 
other principles of Catholic social thought.  As such, while the 
promotion of the dignity and freedom of the human person are 
noteworthy goals, a preferential option for people with disabilities, 
ensures that efforts are aimed at the promotion of human dignity and 
the protection of the freedom of individuals with disabilities 
specifically. Similarly, while the advancement of community is vital 
for sustaining human life, consideration to the principles of 
subsidiarity and solidarity and special attention to the role of the 
family will ensure that we are doing our best to serve the vulnerable 
in community first. It is only when all of these points are taken in sum 
that we can truly be making a preferential option for people with 
disabilities.  
